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Forrester Thinks Some Retailers Are Leaving Too Much Cache On The Table

Written by Evan Schuman
February 2nd, 2010
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Although retail sites are obviously very fond of cache, a new report from Forrester Research states that many developers are focusing only on one type of cache and leaving a lot of potential performance boosts in the ether. The report talks about server cache versus browser and edge cache. “Forrester has found that many companies do not take advantage of all three levels of caches in their architecture. Application development professionals often focus on optimizing the server-side cache while ignoring the browser cache or optimize their Web-page design to take advantage of browser caching only to be stung by geographic latency because they don’t know that they should use a content delivery network.”

Forrester stresses the importance of factoring in geography when making cache decisions but points out that IT shouldn’t confuse a dense population of customers with the company’s best (read: most profitable) customers. “Caching nearest to your users goes without saying, but most companies must allocate their caching dollars carefully, and your biggest investment should be close to your most profitable customers. Your most profitable customers may not be located in your highest concentrations of customers. Work with your marketing department to analyze customer profitability and location, and then review this data at least annually.”


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Kill All The Passwords

This article does mention, but does not give enough attention to, the fact that the attacks discussed are only feasible when the encrypted password file can be copied and subjected to an offline attack. The trick is to have authentication performed on a separate, much more strongly secured host - such as an Active Directory Domain Controller, or a Kerberos server, or a NIS+ server, or even using something as banal as an LDAP-over-SSL authentication dialog. In these environments, the odds of the "password file" being stolen and subjected to an offline attack go to near zero, and only online attacks may be carried out by the attacker. With sensible exponential backoff between failed password attempts, lockout after a modest number of failed attempts on a single account, and pattern detection, that minimum 7 character password is quite secure enough. Passwords aren't dead yet for security purposes, and they will be with us for a very long while to come for practical purposes. The trick is to employ them correctly. Read more...
The possibilities you describe are years away from being implemented at best, so for the moment passwords are an ugly reality. Luckily, password managers can easily manage hundreds of passwords of any length. The only thing a user needs to remember is the master password. It seems like an easier task to educate users on how to use password managers rather than implement complex security technology on a global basis. Read more...