Quantcast StorefrontBacktalk » Blog Archive » Clarifying, Somewhat, The PCI Wireless Security Standards
advertisement
advertisement

Clarifying, Somewhat, The PCI Wireless Security Standards

Written by David Taylor
July 22nd, 2009
Like this story? Share it
To share this story with people in your social network, please click on the network icons below.

GuestView Columnist David Taylor is the Founder of the PCI Knowledge Base and former E-Commerce and Security analyst with Gartner.

The Wireless Special Interest Group of the PCI SSC has just issued a set of guidelines to help companies ensure that their wireless networks are secure and effectively segmented to limit the potential for damage to the cardholder data environment if a portion of the wireless network should be compromised.

(Related story: our coverage of the new PCI wireless guideline document itself.) Given that such a compromise resulted in the TJX breach and many others, the document provides some very worthwhile guidance. OK. So it’s a good document. What’s the point of writing about an implementation guideline beyond telling people to read it? Actually, there are three points that I think are worth making relative to wireless security, based on our PCI best practices research:

  • A wireless IDS/IPS is still not mandated
    One of the technical controls that was introduced with PCI DSS 1.2 is the wireless IDS/IPS. It’s listed as an option, with the other option being to manually carry a laptop around corporate and stores running wireless networks on a quarterly (or more frequent) basis and see whether any networks appear that the security person (if any) does not recognize.

    Although it’s certainly understandable that, for SMEs, the cost of a wireless IDS/IPS can be prohibitive, this is the sort of technology that should be mandatory for larger (i.e., Level 1 and 2) companies. That is not only because of the time and effort that it saves, but also because it can be extremely difficult to spot “rogue” or malicious networks in dense urban areas, shopping malls and large multi-company facilities.

    Beyond the analytics provided by such automated tools, it is also necessary for the company to maintain accurate device inventories and implement a thorough remediation process. But the point here is that the labor intense the wireless network detection process is, the less often it’s going to be performed, and the less value it’s going to deliver in terms of early breach detection.

  • Separating “Rogue” from “Malicious” WLANs
    One of the aspects of wireless security that I wish this implementation guideline covered in more detail is the detection of rogue wireless networks, especially at the store level. An increasingly common hack is for criminals to find live, open network plugs in the backend of retail stores and plug in small, discreet wireless access points, which can allow them to bypass some network segmentation controls, and remotely gather information.

    Whether in this document or another document, it would be a very useful guideline to help IT managers and even store managers know what to look for physically as well as technically. Although PCI QSAs are very experienced in looking for these hacks, many self-assessors rely heavily on simple network scans and do not do a physical inventory of all network access points at all stores to see what’s plugged into them.

    In addition, it is very rare for the results of the wireless network scans to be compared with an accurate store-level IT device inventory, because most are out of date or do not reflect the myriad different wireless network pilots, implemented by multiple local and regional vendors as well as corporate.

    The result is that a store manager or IT manager from corporate or a regional office may not be able to tell whether a new wireless network was installed by a legitimate vendor or was installed surreptitiously. Since most store or regional IT managers are reluctant to simply unplug a device (due to the risk of messing up a business application), malicious wireless network devices may be left in place for weeks or months at a time.


  • advertisement

    One Comment | Read Clarifying, Somewhat, The PCI Wireless Security Standards

    1. Samir Palnitkar Says:

      David makes some very good points here. As described in the wireless guidelines document, a wireless IDS/IPS is really the only practical way to achieve PCI compliance. Walkaround audit are expensive, unreliable and not scalable. Traditional, onsite wireless IDS/IPS systems have often come with a high price tag and only a few large organizations can afford them.

    Leave a Reply

    Newsletter

    Quickly catch-up on the latest in E-Commerce and Retail Tech with our free weekly newsletter, with urgent bulletins as news merits.
    advertisement

    Most Recent Comments

    Kill All The Passwords

    This article does mention, but does not give enough attention to, the fact that the attacks discussed are only feasible when the encrypted password file can be copied and subjected to an offline attack. The trick is to have authentication performed on a separate, much more strongly secured host - such as an Active Directory Domain Controller, or a Kerberos server, or a NIS+ server, or even using something as banal as an LDAP-over-SSL authentication dialog. In these environments, the odds of the "password file" being stolen and subjected to an offline attack go to near zero, and only online attacks may be carried out by the attacker. With sensible exponential backoff between failed password attempts, lockout after a modest number of failed attempts on a single account, and pattern detection, that minimum 7 character password is quite secure enough. Passwords aren't dead yet for security purposes, and they will be with us for a very long while to come for practical purposes. The trick is to employ them correctly. Read more...
    The possibilities you describe are years away from being implemented at best, so for the moment passwords are an ugly reality. Luckily, password managers can easily manage hundreds of passwords of any length. The only thing a user needs to remember is the master password. It seems like an easier task to educate users on how to use password managers rather than implement complex security technology on a global basis. Read more...