Quantcast StorefrontBacktalk » Blog Archive » PCI Human Train Wreck Coming Next Year For Level 2s
advertisement
advertisement

PCI Human Train Wreck Coming Next Year For Level 2s

Written by Walter Conway
November 30th, 2009
Like this story? Share it
To share this story with people in your social network, please click on the network icons below.

A 403 Labs QSA, PCI Columnist Walt Conway has worked in payments and technology for more than 30 years, 10 of them with Visa.

Many Level 2 merchants are just now realizing that their PCI world has changed. Under rules announced this summer, Level 2 MasterCard merchants—like their Level 1 brethren—will require an onsite assessment by a QSA starting in 2010. What’s the difference between self-assessing and an onsite review? Actually, there are 525 differences.

But what I worry about most is a fourth quarter 2010 PCI train wreck as the new rules collide with human frailty and the calendar. The result may be that even some Level 1 merchants and processors don’t get their assessments (and ROCs) completed on schedule.

MasterCard’s Double-Barreled Announcement.
This past summer, MasterCard announced that all “Level 2 merchants must complete an annual onsite assessment conducted by a PCI SSC certified Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) and must validate compliance by 31 December 2010.” It also announced that Level 1 merchants previously using their internal auditors to validate PCI compliance must now have a QSA conduct that assessment.

MasterCard made one clarification, albeit a bit delayed, which eases the impact for some merchants. It removed what I call the “reciprocity gotcha” from its guidelines that, in this case, said if you are classified as a Level 2 merchant by one brand, then you are a Level 2 for MasterCard–regardless of your volume. For example, if you had 1 million Visa transactions and 500,000 MasterCard transactions, you would be a Level 2 for Visa and either a Level 3 or Level 4 for MasterCard. Because you are a Level 2 for Visa, under the reciprocity gotcha, you are now a Level 2 for MasterCard as well. In the good old days of self-assessment, this classification didn’t mean much. But with MasterCard’s new rules, being Level 2 means a whole lot. The good news, at least for some merchants, is that MasterCard removed this reciprocity provision from its merchant level definitions.

525 Ways A ROC Is Not A SAQ.
When a merchant validates its compliance with a Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ), it checks a box for each requirement, thereby indicating that the control is in place. Most merchants are conscientious and careful, assembling an internal team of business and technology staff to tackle the project.

An onsite assessment is different. The assessor will need to see hard evidence of the merchant’s compliance in practice. For example, an internal team may be tempted to say, “We have a firewall, so we can check that box.” An assessor, on the other hand, would need to see a network diagram and examine the firewall rule set before determining if it is properly configured to meet the intent of the PCI requirements.

The PCI Council shapes the assessor’s role through its Quality Assurance (QA) program, which was introduced this year. This program promotes, in the Council’s words, “certainty that Assessors approved by the PCI SSC provide quality services to merchants and service providers by adhering to the high standards set forth in signed agreements and validation requirements.” It is a good program, with benefits for merchants and the assessors and scanning vendors evaluated.

As part of its QA program, the PCI Council developed a scoring matrix to evaluate ROCs (Report On Compliance) submitted for review. QSAs, in turn, use the matrix to guide their onsite work. The matrix stipulates how QSAs should validate each PCI requirement, including observation, written documentation or interviewing the merchant’s staff. Here are two examples: For Requirement 3.2.1 (Do not store the contents of the mag stripe.), the matrix specifies seven sets of logs and databases to be sampled, examined and documented; for Requirement 5.2 (Ensure antivirus mechanisms can generate audit logs.), it specifies five separate actions, including documentation review, observations and a description of how the sample was drawn.

In total, there are 525 items specified in the scoring matrix and, believe me, your QSA will follow all of them. Failing to do so can mean that the QSA firm enters remediation (its name goes red on the PCI Council’s Web site) and, in extreme cases, that the firm may have its status revoked by the Council.


advertisement

6 Comments | Read PCI Human Train Wreck Coming Next Year For Level 2s

  1. John Bailey Says:

    This is retail, folks. Year end deadlines are really unacceptable and should be moved to mid-year…July 31st for example. If you’re like my company….nothing can happen in the last 6 weeks of the year as we lock down for the holidays. These people totally have their heads in the sand.

  2. Walt Conway Says:

    Thanks for the comment, John, and you raise a great point. I am regularly mystified by how particular dates get picked by the PCI Council and other bodies. For example, what’s special about June 30 for replacing WEP encryption (or the March 31, 2009 end date for new WEP applications) or October for the updated DSS? But these really pale compared to the year-end date chosen by MasterCard which conflicts with seasonal system freezes…including their own!

    Let’s hope someone there will catch this. I fear the only reasonable alternative might be for acquirers to cut merchants some slack, to the extent they can. At least we can hope!

    Your best bet is to fight human nature and get cracking on your on-site earlier in the year. This way it’s done. And as I pointed out, there is no economic benefit to waiting – you have to validate annually, so doing it earlier or later costs the same.

  3. Gray Taylor Says:

    Walt,
    This article has generated a lot of interest with retailers facing the dreaded MC L2 issue. Not surprisingly, some acquirers are questioning the veracity of the relaxation of “reciprocity”. Is there anything in the public domain from MC to substantiate this?

    To John’s comment, I have been constantly surprised at the lack of knowledge about retailing exhibited by those setting mandates (cost burdens to be added to timing issue). Acquirers are in the same boat as merchants – not knowing/understanding what is coming down the pipe next. Only recourse is to get involved in the process and get vocal!

    Thanks for the article!

  4. Walt Conway Says:

    I agree very much with your suggestion, Gray, that every large merchant should get involved in the PCI process. The good news is that I understand there are well over 300 Participating Organizations. Now all we need to do is make sure everyone is heard! The Council is listening, now we just need to work with the brands a little more.

    As for reciprocity, here is a link to MasterCard’s merchant definitions: http://www.mastercard.com/us/sdp/merchants/merchant_levels.html. If you read it carefully, you’ll note the reciprocity provision in the merchant level definitions (e.g., “or if you are considered a Level X by any of the other card brands”) is gone. You should also check out their FAQ (issued two months after the fact…) here: http://www.mastercard.com/us/sdp/assets/pdf/SDP%20Program%20Revisions%20FAQ.pdf

  5. Walt Conway Says:

    I have a follow-up to Gray’s questioning my statement on MasterCard’s reciprocity being relaxed. He’s right; I was wrong.

    I have been in contact with MasterCard and they corrected me: “we [MasterCard] never removed reciprocity from our rules. The language was simply changed from “competing brand” to “visa”. the “competing brand” lanugage has been in the rules since 2005 and this was meant to facilitate alignment between MasterCard and Visa.”

    I stand corrected. That means that not some but ALL L2 merchants will need an onsite. See the latest on these developments with some good news here: http://www.storefrontbacktalk.com/securityfraud/mastercard-blinks-drops-dec-31-level-2-pci-deadline/

  6. Robert Spivak Says:

    I wanted to comment on the dates. I agree that they seem to be timed poorly for certain retailers. while for others it fits well. Working with software vendors we find that depending on the industry, certain times of the year are good and other are not.

    For example, a college book seller will need to be locked down both in September and in January and the holidays are not as big a deal. While a Bridal shop will state that March through June nothing can change. Your standard Big box stores will tell you that Back to school and Holidays are locked down. Also depending on what region of the world you are in it can change. The US Thanksgiving is the biggest shopping day of the year for the US, while in Canada Boxing day is the big sales day.

    So we find that if you are involved with enough retailers, in different verticals, and different regions of the world, there is never a good time to implement changes.

    It has been my experience, however, that as long as there is a process to implement changes and the merchant can provide evidence that the process is followed, usually there can be some leniency given to the implementation of a mandate.

Leave a Reply

Newsletter

Quickly catch-up on the latest in E-Commerce and Retail Tech with our free weekly newsletter, with urgent bulletins as news merits.
advertisement

Most Recent Comments

What’s The Rush For New PCI Call Center Requirements?

And I have not heard anyone mention the impact on companies who provide quality improvement services. Many merchants hire quality improvement companies to review their audio recordings to provide guidance on how to improve their sales staff’s effectiveness in customer service and sales retention. PCI Council needs to rethink this requirement until there is a widely available commercially viable solution. Read more...
Another ridiculous decision where regulators don't think critically enough about the unintended consequences of their decision. This will be a huge problem for the credit and collections industry. We have to keep all recorded calls for other reasons not related to cc information. We can't purge all of our calls and we don't have the technology to not record part of the conversation. Even if we did, I am not sure we could afford it. Read more...
This "clarification" is causing a lot of panic with large FS clients who now appear to be non-compliant after spending 7 figure sums on their compliance programs. The only alternative to call recording would now appear to be some sort of IVR/push button type interrupt to take card data away from the contact centre. The council is a position to force that sort of process and technology change and this may backfire on them and the vendors that lobbied hard for this clarification. Read more...
PCI council has made a one-sided decision; They should have done a much more in-depth research that could have provided more insight on what regards to the implications of such decision. Read more...

Will Old OS Cause PCI Violation? No, But Marketing Still Says So

This is an interesting issue, because there's more to it than what's apparent on the surface. PA-DSS requires supported and patched operating systems and other software components (e.g., databases, libraries, Java, etc.) per PA-DSS 7.1.b and 8.1, and the option for compensating controls simply isn't there. Merchants can make use of compensating controls for most PCI DSS requirements, but only when legitimate constraints exist and only in ways that meet the intent and rigor of the requirement and go above and beyond the other PCI DSS requirements. Read more...
Why would one automatically upgrade to a "new" OS -- some of the older versions of certain OS-es are more stable and more robust than the crap being peddled today. This is yet another clear example of PCI SSC being out of touch with reality. Rather than requiring a "current" OS, the requirement should be to demonstrate the OS in use is stable and robust, and is adequately hardened against threats. Read more...
There are compensating controls that encrypt the swipe at the driver level as it enter the PC, there are hardware encrypting card swipes so the cardholder data is already encrypted before it comes to the PC -- either of these, especially the second, would remove the OS entirely from a cardholder data risk profile. Read more...
In my opinion, the only thing the vendor did wrong was they didn’t know of that FAQ entry. Even if they did, it changes nothing about the need for merchants to update software that no longer receives updates. Read more...

MasterCard Blinks, Drops Dec. 31 Level 2 PCI Deadline

Reciprocity between MasterCard and Visa was always been a factor in Acquirer merchant level assignments. The brief removal of reciprocity generated a great deal of interest in being able to be classified at a lower level in MasterCard's world. Nevertheless the return of the reciprocity language in the December changes did not effectively create any new Level 2 merchants, but it DID dash the hopes of a lot of them.... :-( Read more...
Let's given them credit??? For being idiotic in the first place? Not on your life! Everyone has just had to scramble and include the costs of the previously announced M/C requirement in their 2010 budgets, and start negotiating with the QSAs for the additional services. All for naught! Read more...
"A bunch of Level 3 and Level 4 merchants just became Level 2s". Is this an accurate statement? MasterCard & Visa have historically included the caveat "or is a Level X in another brand" in their level setting criteria. MasterCard appeared to back way from this in the June pronouncement, and have simply returned to the status quo. Have Acquirers have been tracking and reporting merchants at separate levels by brand? Read more...
I stick by my comment (quoted in the column) about a bunch of L3 and L4 merchants becoming L2s and requiring an onsite. To me, what made MasterCard's original requirement for an onsite assessment for L2s palatable was that they took away their reciprocity provision. That is, they seemed to focus on larger merchants with over a million MasterCard trans/year. With reciprocity in place, a lot of smaller merchants are pulled into the onsite requirement. Rather than causing confusion, I think reciprocity will lead to additional work for processors and acquirers. Read more...

Retailers Sue POS Vendor, Questions Raised Where PCI Duties Stop

I would add a couple more questions: "did the breach involve the use of the default passwords?" (The story doesn't say.) And "were the default passwords used by Computer World to remotely administer the store systems?" "where is the PCI auditor in all this?" Did the restaurant group think they didn't need an audit because Radiant was (mis)representing Aloha as PCI compliant? How is a retailer or even a PCI auditor to know otherwise? A PCI auditor is not necessarily a qualified computer forensic investigator capable of finding the card data on the hard drives. They can only base a decision on information given to them by others. Read more...
There are so many holes in the process it will be difficult to pin blame on just one constituent. It is ridiculous that the technology exists to better secure these transactions (PIN, EMV, etc) yet banks won't use them. Only the banks or government can force this change, and retailers will suffer until then. Read more...
A major issue in this case will be if the restaurants had any support agreements in place with Computer World and if so what those agreements say. In my experience many single unit/small operators choose to skip the support agreements in favor of a "pay as you go" arrangement. In this scenario I can't imagine how the POS VAR can be held responsible for a system they don't own nor exclusively manage. Read more...
There is a big difference in having the POS installation guide say "make sure you set this password because the security of your CHD depends on this" vs. a POS application not storing the CHD in the first place. Traditionally only the merchant was liable for breaches and PCI related fees (fines). Maybe dragging some of the vendors into the liability mud fight will open the eyes of some of these vendors. Read more...

Should Credit Card Transactions Be Free? There May Be A Way

Here in the Netherlands, where the population is notoriously penny-pinching, credit card acceptance is amazingly low. It's both a result of the consumer not wanting to pay interest on everyday purchases as well as merchants not giving up a slice of the action. It is both legal and common to pass the processing fee onto the customer as a surcharge. Now things are moving to leave the credit cards behind: mobile phone payments are becoming more and more common here, and the transaction fees are minimal. Parking and entertainment (movie/concert tickets, nightclubs) have been amongst the first, and it's rapidly gaining momentum because the market has been hungry for the convenience at a price it is willing to pay. Read more...
"Free" is an illusion. Don't charge one person but charge double to someone else. I am very skeptical on anyone who says that advertising will create valid cashflow. Just look at the advertising struggles in a TiVo world. And if you sell your customers data, just be warned that the one group that might have issue with that are you customers (which to me is very important to cashflow. Read more...
Another factor not mentioned here is the impending costs that the processors and issuers are going to incur when someone decides on an end-to-end encryption method, and it then becomes government mandated. I can guarantee that this is a when question and not an if question. The back-end networks are pretty antiquated right now, and it's going to cost billions to replace everything. The cost of tech may be going down, but the cost of replacing millions of servers and hardware, and creating new, proprietary, software is still really expensive. Read more...
Accepting credit cards are not "risk-free" for merchants, contrary to Jim's comments above. Chargebacks are an expense - both in terms of actual transaction reversals and costs associated with managing the process. Chargeback rules and expenses can be everything from a thorny issue to an onerous expense for some merchants, especially for convenience stores that allow customers to pay for gasoline at the pump, or other retailers that allow in-store self-checkout options. Read more...
I've wondered for years why the price of transactions has been so high. Phone companies long ago started offering unlimited calling for flat rates because they understood that in many cases it cost more to report on the transactions (calls) than it did to fulfill them. Read more...
If a home-owner defaults on the mortgage, who is taking the risk? The bank making the loan to the consumer or the person selling the house? It is obviously the bank that takes this risk and is rewarded for that risk through interest rate charges. In my mind, we have mixed together two distinct and unrelated transactions. Read more...
The one big factor not mentioned in this article is who will take over the risk ? Taking credit cards is risk free to merchants and the issuing Banks take the risk if a customer defaults on the payments ! If you had a "interchange free" payment system will the merchants assume the risk ? Also, if there isn't enough profit for the issuing banks they will stop issuing credit cards which will in turn kill our economy. Read more...

The Dangerous Out-Of-Scope PCI Charade

If tokens are ever deemed in-scope, then where does the line stop? I ask this because it would mean that all timestamps, sequential number, random numbers or any other piece of information that may or may not be used to generate a token is within scope -- all data a POS uses and stores, not just payment data. Read more...
Having the ability to do both Tokenization and End to End Encryption (not mere point to point) can have tremendous scope and risk reduction benefits and agility to adapt to change in this fast moving compliance landscape. Being able to have both on tap from a single platform is a solid approach to avoiding the pitfalls. Read more...
But the consumer walks into a particular retail chain, gives their payment card to someone wearing that chain's uniform and the card is swiped. If, six months later, there's a breach and that card was misused, it's the retailer who will in the spotlight. They're the deep pocket and, therefore, the target. If the consumer is angry and wants to cut off business, it will hit the retailer. Therefore, if the retailer is going to end up being blamed no matter what, they have to stay involved. Read more...
True, that someone may be storing a token-to-PAN cross reference. But that would be the bank, not the retailer. If the bank is not sure they can keep their data secure, then there are bigger problems to be addressed than bringing tokens into scope. Read more...
Good general point, Steve, but for the record, not all tokenization is done the same way. Many tokens are associated with lookup lists that allow for them to re-matched to the card data if it's needed, such as for a chargeback. A token doesn't have to be decryptable (is that a word?) for there to be a way to access the original data. Read more...
The out-of-scope argument is very valid but in reference to tokens, the premise of temporarily out-of-scope or abruptly deemed in-scope is flawed. Conway was quoted “anything that could be made unreadable can, in various ways, be made readable again,” this statement is true when talking about encryption technologies (all encryption technologies) but not so with true tokens. True tokens are in no way related to the original data other than as a reference key. Read more...