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What Did Hannaford Know And When Did It Know It?
Written by Evan Schuman
March 19, 2008
As details of the Hannaford data breach trickle out, the familiar data breach pattern of apparent inconsistencies has emerged.
For example, Hannaford's people have been stressing to reporters that they were PCI compliant and, indeed, that they not only were certified compliant in Spring 2007, but that they were re-certified compliant in February 2008. (See The Hannaford PCI Fallout column.)
But that raises more troubling questions than it offers comforting assurances. As a Level 1 retailer, Hannaford is only required to undergo a PCI assessment once a year. If they were compliant in the Spring—regardless of which month it was—it seems eyebrow-raising that they would have sought another assessment so soon.
That kind of assessment would have likely taken from three weeks to two months to complete and it would have been at least a week—and much more likely a lot longer than one week—for the assessor to analyze the results, write up the reports and get approvals from the processing bank and the relevant card brands, said Ed Adams, CEO of Security Innovation, an information security consulting firm specializing in PCI issues, based in Wilmington, Mass..
That timeline would suggest that Hannaford would have started the assessment process around November or early December, which would be an unusual thing to do for a Level 1 retailer that had just been certified in the Spring. Unless it had a very good reason to seek a re-cerification, such as a data breach that had not been disclosed, Adams said. There are other reasons a chain might request an earlier assessment—such as if they changed assessors and that was the only timeslot available—but Adams said that seems highly unlikely.
Then there's the consistent description that the breach happened when the data was in transit. Had the data been properly encrypted—as PCI requires—the transmission data should have been of little use to the culprits. Is it possible, Adams asks, that the data was either not properly encrypted or that it was actually grabbed at a much earlier stage (at the POS, in that brief unencrypted state)? Could the consistent "in transmission" answers be because that's the only explanation that would be in concert with being in compliance?
Then there's the matter of statements that no personal information was accessed, merely credit card numbers and expiration dates. Setting aside the other concerns, there are questions as to how in-store frauds could have happened given the difficulty in creating bogus cards with no names or verification numbers?
Other comments made by Hannaford point to POS upgrades last year—which is consistent with other information out there. But one comment said that it was their wireless encryption that was upgraded. Was the fact that they went out of their way to tout a wireless encryption upgrade suggesting that the breach was wireless? |
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Evan Schuman is the former retail technology editor for eWEEK.com, PCMagazine, CIOInsight and retail reporter for RISNews and Consumer Goods Technology. Having covered IT issues for 21 years - and other stuff like legal affairs, politics, Wall Street and the environment for about eight years before that - Schuman is in a good position to gripe about technology trends and sometimes accidentally make a good point.
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